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PRELHHNARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 11, Sheet J
No. 80-?100-AFX
CA 5 (Jones, Fay;
C!issenting)

ROGERS et al. (countv
commissioners)

v.
LODGE et al. (class of
black residents)

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Whether a countv's system of at-large elections

unconstitutionally "dilutes" the voting rights of black residents
of the county.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELmv:

Burke County is a large (8 32

sq. miles), predominantly rural county in Georgia.

The

population of the county is about 10,000, a slight majority of
whom are black, although the black

po~n

has been steaoi ly

~- ~~~~~-1

- ?. -

..

declining.

(Plaintiffs maintain there is no Jnnqer a black

majority of voting

~

residents.)

About 38% of the registered

voters in the county are black. /
The county is governed by a five member Board of
Cornrnissj_oners, and hy various committees appointed by the
commissioners.

As mancaten hy state statute (Ga. Laws l9Jl,

p.390), all five commissioners are elected at the same time, for
four year terms.

Candidates for commissioner must run for

~

~

specific numbered posts (although there are no subdistrict
residency requirements for a specific post) and be elected hv
majoritv vote.

Ga. Code Ann.

~~34-1015

&

1413.

vRun-off

elections are held in the event no candidate achieves a majority.
V' No black has ever been elected as a commissioner.

This suit was brought as a class action on behalf of all
black residents of Burke County, who aJleqe that

t~e

method of

selecting commissioners dilutes the relative strength of their
votes, in violation of their First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendment rights.

Plaintjffs sought division of the

county into single member districts.
The DC

(C~J.

Alaimo, S.D.Ga.) held that the election scheme,

-

although racially neutral
,. when adopted jn 1911, is being
maintained for "invidious pur _oses". In support of this
...,

conclusion, the DC made the followinq findings:
1) There is a history of discouraging registration of black
voters in the countv.

Prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act,

devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries
kept registration of black voters at about 6.8% of those
eligible.
register

..

Prior to commencement of this suit, voters could

at ~nly

one Jocation in the county, which made

registration difficul.t for the manv hlack residents without ready
access to transportation.
2) In the few instances when blacks have been candidates for
commissioner, voting has proceeded largely along racial lines.
Bloc voting has also been

evi~ent

in elections for the city

council of Waynesboro, the county seat.

~~~

3) Blacks are virtually ~ eluded from participation in the
/
powerful Burke County Democratic Committee.
4) The county commissioners have
needs of black residents.

been ~nresponsive

to the

There have been only token

appointments of blacks to countv committees.

Roads in the county

./

have been paved in a racially discriminatory manner, with paving
often stopping at the point v..rhere a concentration of black
res ide nee s beg ins.

The commissioners have retained svmbols of

the county's history of racial

~iscrimination,

such as the

/

V "coloreds" and "whites" toilet signs and the "Nigger-hook" at the
countv courthouse.
5) The "socio-economic" status of blacks in the county is
depressed, and their level of education lags behind that of
whites.
The DC concluded from the ahove findings that blacks were
"denied access to the political process" in the county, and that
plaintiffs had made out a case of unconstitutional voting
dilution.

It ordered that the county be divided into five

districts, each of which would elect one commissioner, and
adopted a districting plan submitted by plaintiffs.

It further

ordered a special election of the five commissioners at the same
time as the Nov. 1978 general election.

Prior to the 1978

election, while the case was pending before CA 5, Justice Powell
granted a stay of the DC order.
HOLDING BELOW: The CA 5 affirmed the DC, holding that
plaintiffs had established both Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment violations.

The CA noted that the DC had relied

heavily on a "test" for determining unconstitutional voting
dilution set out in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CAS
1973), which v1as subsequentJy c'liscredited in Mobile v. Bolden,

446

u.s. 55 (lC\80).

(Zimmer held that unlawful voting dilution

could be presumed from an "aggregate" of factors such as a
minority group's lack of access to political processes,
unresponsiveness of elected representatives to minority
interests, and the effects of past discrimination on minorjty
participation in the electoral process.)

Nevertheless, theCA

found that the DC had anticipated Mobile's explicit requirement
of a demonstration of "discriminatory purpose" in voting dilution
cases, and had made findings sufficient to support its conclusion
that the Burke County at-large election system was being
maintained for the purpose of minimizing the political impact of
black voters in the county.

The CA further held that while the

presence of Zimmer factors in a voting dilution case is no longer
determinative of a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation,
it is still "indicative" of intentional discrimination in
maintenance of an at-larqe election system.
J. Henderson, dissenting, thought the case should be
remanded to the DC for reconsideration in light of Mobile.
CONTENTIONS:

Appellants contend 1) the CA erred in

concluding that purposeful discrimination had been shown, and in
using the Zimmer factors to create an "inference" of such

,,

discrimination; 2) the CA erred in not remanding to the DC for
further findings in light of Mobile; 3) the CA erred in holding
that voting dilution can be the basis of a Fifteenth Amendment
violation; 4) the doctrine of voting dilution is inapplicable to
county governing bodies; 5) assuminq a constitutional violation,
the DC's relief is inappropriate.
Appellees contend that the CA accurately appliAd the
principles established in Mobile, and that remand was unnecessary
because the DC findings were sufficient to establish purposeful
discrimination in maintenance of the election system.

They

maintain that appellants nir not challenqe the DC's factual
findings before the CA.

They also contend that the relief

ordered was limited and reasonable, in that it noes not affect
the basic composition or responsibilities of the commissioners,
and does not alter the structure of county government.
DISCUSSION: Jurisdiction for the appeal is established by 28

u.s.c.

§1254 (2), since theCA held that the Georgia statutes

governing Burke County election procedures were repugnant to the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

The case does not appear

appropriate for summary disposition.
The only major issue is whether the lower courts correctly
applied principles established in Mobile--and particularly the
requirement of a showing of intentional discrimination--to thP.
facts of this case.

However, no opinion in Mobile commanded a

majority of the Court, and this case would provide an opportunity
for clarification of the principles applicable to constitutional
challenges to at-large election schemes.

Moreover, while the

disposition of the case below was somewhat fact-specific, the
facts found by the DC here seem more highly indicative of

- 6 -

intentional discrimination than those in Mobile.

This case may

be a good vehicle for further explication of the extent to which
"discriminatory purpose" i.n voting dilution cases may be inferred
from a record which lacks a "smoking gun".
An interesting wrinkle is the fact that the CA sustained the
voting dilution claim even though blacks constitute a maioritv of
the residents in the county.

However, blacks constitute a

minority of the registered voters in the countv, a circumstance
the DC found attributable to official discouragement of black
voting registration.

Thus, the black population majorHv ma y not

be a dispositive factor.
I would note probal)le jurisdiction.
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm.
7/17/81
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

"-.__../

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Dick Fallon

DATE:

February 19, 1982

RE:

No. 80-2100, Rogers et al. v. Lodge et al.

Question Presented
The

question

is

whether

the

plaintiffs

carried

their

burden of proving discriminatory intent in the maintenance of
an at-large electoral system in Burke County, Georgia.
ANALYSIS

•'

2.

In this bobtail memo I address only the central problem of
this case: the criteria for identifying "discriminatory intent"
behind State-structured voting districts.

Viewed in isolation,

I would be very surprised if this for you were a hard case.

@

The large principles now are clear.
districts

are

Mobile

Bolden,

v.

not

~

u.s.

(1971).

In order

the

constitution,

intent."

E.g.,

unconstitutional.

u.s.

446

Regester, 412
@

se

At-large voting

55

(1980)

("Mobile");

City

of

White

v.

u.s.

124

755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
to

invalidate

___

an

__..,__.
plaintiff
must

a

See Mobile, supra

at-large scheme
show

under

"discriminatory

(plurality opinion of Stewart, J.,

joined by the Chief, LFP, and WHR; dissenting opinion of BRW).
Nor do I think you would find much difficulty in applying
these

principles

to

the

facts

of

this

In

case.

finding

discriminatory intent in this case, both the district court and
the court of appeals relied almost exclusively on the kinds of
./

~
~

factors

expressly
opinion

held
in

insufficient

Mobile.

The

in

Justice

district

Stewart's

court

in

fact

reliance on the same factors as those

~::t:
6-

by the lower courts in Mobile--the so-called

~ See Zimmer v. McKeithen,

~-'· ~

485 F.2d 1297

nom East Carroll Parish School Bd.

~

(1976).

(The

district

court

did,

(CAS

1973), a

v. Marshall,
however,

424
make

u.s.

636

clear

a

~~~ finding, not only that the factors were present, but there was

~i-t

"discriminatory intent.")

~

factors

~(

- ~~

\fAJp~
II

~ lude

(2)

?

(1) the group's access to political processes,

esponsiveness

,,

Under the Zimmer test the "primary•

of

elected

representatives

to

the

3.
group's

interests,

supporting

(3)

the

importance

at-large di str icting,

and

of

( 4)

the

state

policy

the effects of past

discrimination upon the group's participation in the political
system.

~'(!/"

?

I

~~
~r-

('/'/

See

F.2d,

485

at

The

1305.

test

also

recognizes

"secondary" or "enhancing" factors, which are more specific to
a particular set of facts.

In this case the court of appeals

tried to save the Zimmer test by giving a very narrow reading

to Mobile.

f~ctors

these

construed Mobile

It

would

not

create

to hold only
a

necessary or

' presumpt1on of discriminatory intent.
a

particular case,

Thus,

reasoning

factors

as

proof of

that

part

of

the
a

proof of

irrebuttable

See App., at 38-39.

In

the factors could still suffice.

district

more

that

court

had

only

situation-sensitive

used

the

inquiry,

the

court of appeals found the existence of discriminatory intent
on

---------------~-------the

facts

plurality

presented.

opinion--which

In

you

my

view,

----

Justice

joined--fairly

can

Stewart's

be

read

as

establishing that more direct and specific proof of intent must
be

provided.

Mere

U.S., at 73-74

sociological

facts will not do.

Justice

446

(discounting the probative value of each of the

four factors on which the district court had relied).
Mobile,

See

Stewart

dismissed

reliance

on

the

Thus, in
Zimmer

factors in the following way:
(1) No black ever had been elected to the city commission,
but "It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, but
that

fact

alone does

446 U.S., at 73 •

..

not work

a constitutional deprivation."

4.

The

( 2)

district

found

court

discriminated against Negroes

the

that

in employment,

commission

but "evidence of

discrimination by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as
the

tenuous

most

constitutional

and

validity

of

the

they attained their offices."
(3)
"past

There

was

a

evidence

circumstantial

long

electoral

system

under

local history of
in

the

segregation,

manner

of

original

condemn government action that is itself unlawful."
Other

factors

which

Id., at 74.

discrimination cannot,

(4)

the

of

of

the

voting

system,

but
sin,
7

Id.

apparently

disadvantageous to blacks, "tend naturally to disadvantage any
voting

minority"

but

were

not

~hemselves

in

evidence

of

discrimination against a particular group. Id.
Obviously

these

fact-specific

were
\

conclusions,

which

could be altered on the different facts of a different case.

I

But in this case the same logic would seem to apply with equal
validity.

would

be

If

there

that

the

is

any

district

against blacks

in

blacks

to attend

elected

however,

by

the

strong
court

basis
here

for

distinction,

found

it

discrimination

the operation of the Democratic party--few

this

evidence of discriminatory

intent

in maintaining a system of

since 1911.

only

Again,

Mobile

in-place

is

etc.

of

voting districts

logic

political conventions,

Moreover,

"attenuated"

if there

is

request for direct challenge to the actual illegalities, rather
than

a

relatively unconnected

lawsuit against the natur~ of

the county's electoral districts.

As the cited evidence does

•.

. ,.

·~

..

..

5.
not show directly that local officials kept the voting system
in order to disadvantage blacks, there is no real difficulty in
knocking

down

this

arguable

basis

for

distinction.

(In

attempting to distinguish this case, appellees rely mainly on
two basis:

(a)

Unlike Mobile,

invalidation of

an

entire

this case does not involve the

form of

municipal government;

but

this factor, while relevant to the question of the appropriate
judicial

remedy,

is

irrelevant

to

intent;

and

(b)

the

the

district court here did not indulge the presumption that proof
of the factors necessarily would prove discrimination, but saw
the factors only as identifying relevant evidence; as the above
discussion indicates, however, Justice Stewart•s opinion--which
you joined--seems to me to go further.)
Thus,
applied

to

reverse.

to

summarize,

this
The

marginally

I

think

case--would
record

worse.

of

(In

that your Mobile

almost

local

surely mandate a

discrimination

addition

position--

to

the

vote

arguably

sociological

to
is
and

economic data, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
pointed out that a "Niggerhook" still hangs in the courthouse,
and

it

seems

clear

that

discrimination

municipal services remains pervasive.)

in

the

provision of

On the other hand, the

/ blacks in this case are an absolute majority of the residents
of

the

county

(about

60%),

and

over 50% of those of voting age.
clear

how--in a

at-large voting.

--------....

"causal"

apparently comprise

slightly

This evidence makes it less

sense-- blacks are disadvantaged by

underlying
involving

this
an

case

of

historic

course

form

of

is

that--in

government

a

arguably

situation
producing

"vote dilution"--there seldom if ever will be a "smoking gun."
Does this mean that the Court is destined to fight out--in a
long sequence of cases--whether a particular set of facts does
or does not evidence deliberate
minority

groups?

Should

it

intent to dilute the vote of

mean

that

intent

to

"dilute"

minority votes never could be proved?
The
Mobile

background

Justice

to

White

this

case

dissented,

may

mostly

be

illuminating.

on

the

Court opinion in White v. Regester, supra.

~ /white

In

basis of

his

In my view Justice

had a powerful argument from precedent.

In Regester v.

White the Court upheld a finding of intentional vote dilution
in a redistricting case, relying entirely on a district court's
inferences from the same sort of factors present both in Mobile
and

again

in

this

In

case.

White

v.

Regester

the

Court

indicated a strong disposition to trust the fact-finding of the
District Court,
facts.

See 412

circumstances,

in deference to its proximity to the relevant

u.s.,
the

at 769:
District

"Based on the totality of the
Court

evolved

its

ultimate

assessment of the multi-member district, overlaid, as it was,
on

the cultural

and

economic realities .•.. [It held]

own special vantage point ••.
findings,

representing

as

from its

[relying on the district court's]

they do

a blend of

history and an

intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar
County multi-member district."

•.

.
'·

. 7.
Merely

by

granting

the

present

case,

the

Court

has

signalled how its view has changed since White v. Regester.

No

longer does it want "an intensely local appraisal of design and
impact , "

U• S . ,

412

at

770 •

If

it did,

the

findings

of

the

District Court and the Court of Appeals would not need to be
tested here.
As I understand it,
has

grown

wary

of

~

local

since White v. Regester the Court

appraisals

out

of

respect

for

two

principles:
It

(1)

structure

is

fundamentally

their

intrusive role

own
for

the

business

governments.

There

of

the

is

States

hardly

a

to

more

federal courts than to tell States how to

govern themselves.
(2)

Even

dilution--for

if

the courts did wish

it

seems

phenomenon occurs and

to

indisputable

(b)

fight

both

against votethat

(a)

the

that it is morally wrong--there are

no judicially manageable standards to apply in this area.

Once

setting down this road, it is hard to stop short of quotas and
group representation.
At

the

same

time,

it still seems clear

enough

that the

Court would need to do something in a case where there really
was a "smoking gun"--unambiguous proof of discriminatory intent
in a particular case.
Thus,
purpose,
could

if

the

not,

as

this

case

Court would
the

is

to

need

serve
to

plurality did

IL

any

useful

,

art1culate

in Mobile,

law-guiding

,,

principles.
merely

say:

It
(a)

purpose must be proved specifically, rather then presumed under

,,

8.
some formulaic test; and

(b)

it is not proved here, because it

is hard to prove.
Trying to view the problem from your perspective, I think
two alternatives may merit your consideration:

(1)

Focus

on

the

question:

Whose

This

intent?

is

an

approach suggested by Justice Stewart's Mobile opinion but not
emphasized.

u.s.,

See 446

at 74 n.20: "Among the difficulties

with the District Court's view of the evidence was its failure
to

identify

the

relevant

state
This

"

officials
approach

whose

would

intent

bar

it

considered

repeated

review

of

"attenuated" economic and sociological evidence.

And,

best applied to "action" rather

it could be

applied

at

least

in

some

than "inaction",

situations of

failure

though

to act.

Cf.

your opinion in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.

u.s.,

Corp. 429
( 2)

at 264.

Move in the direction of

Mobile.

At

position

absolutely

Like

first

the majority

blush,

~ Ste : ns ·~ opi ~

Justice

antithetical

Stevens
to

h~inguishes
1\

that

seems
of

cases of

to

in

take

a

the

plurality.

"vote

dilution"

from cases involving direct barriers to voting--a helpful and
important distinction, for--as he emphasizes--the difficulty of
proof

should

regard

to

be

very different

"vote

dilution"

discriminatory intent

as

cases,

between
he

is not relevant.

says

them.

Then,

that

See 446

with

subjective

u.s.,

at 90.

Justice Stevens prefers rather to em hasize three "objective"
factors:
more

(1)

unusual

the
a

"routineness"

voting

of

structure,

a
the

political decision--the
more

suspect;

(2)

the

;'·

~

9.
impact on minority groups; and (3) the presence or absence of a
neutral justification.
In my view the interest of Justice Stevens's approach lies
in the objective factors that he chooses.
becomes

plain

"intent."

that

each

is

most

Upon examination, it

important

as

an

"index"

to

There is no reason to care about the unusual or non-

routine shape of a voting district--as Justice Stevens does-unless

you

indicate

think

ulterior

delicacy in the
about

"odd

that

a

very

purposes.

federal

shapes"

peculiar

Nonetheless,

system,

rather

shape

is

likely

in an area of

to

this

it may be prefer able to talk

than

"corrupt"

or

"bigoted"

legislators.
Without agreeing with Justice Stevens that "intent" should
be abandoned as the ultimate criterion, I think that his threefactor

approach

might

provide

the

basis

for

guidance from this Court to the lower courts.

some

positive

In other words,

with appropriate references to the significance of context, it
might be helpful to identify and suggest the central relevance
of

factors

directly

involving

the

structure

of

the

voting

scheme--factors such as "innocent" or "suspect" appearance, and
the presence or absence of a neutral justification.
above,

in Mobile

the plurality criticized the

Zimmer

As noted
test as

drawing "attenuated" inferences--inferences from evidence, such
as

distributions of

wealth and other

face related to the question in issue.
factors would alleviate this concern.

benefits,

not on

their

Emphasis on more direct

-----------------------

These factors also would

provide a presumption in favor of upholding at-large electoral

10.
districts.

As

emphasized

in Mobile

Justices Stewart and Stevens,
U.S.,

at

most

60

n.7:

"According

municipalities

over

in

the opinions both of

they are very common.
to

the

25,000

See 446

1979 Municipal Yearbook,

people

conducted

at-large

elections of their city commissions or council members as of
1977."
Finally,

I

think that this approach is somwhat analogous

to that of your opinion in Arlington Heights, supra.

See 429

u.s.'

is

at

266-268:

evidentiary
official
from

source,

actions

the

"The

particularly

taken

normal

for

background

historical
if

it

invidious

procedural

reveals

a

purposes....

sequence

also

one

series

of

Departures

might

afford

evidence •..• Substantive departures too may be relevant."
To

complete

opinion

there

the

also

reference
suggested

to

Arlington

another

Heights,

"backstop"

your

safeguard

against judicial interference with the decisionmaking of other
bodies.
a

"Proof that the decision ••• was motivated in part by

racially discriminatory

required
would,

purpose would

not necessarily have

invalidation of the challenged decision.

however,

establishing

that

have
the

shifted

to

the

Village

the

Such proof
burden

of

same decision would have resulted even

had the impermissible purpose not been considered."

429

u.s.,

at 27--271 n.21.
If the Court were interested, it also would be possible to
combine the approaches that I have cited as
~

combined approach, the Court could

(a)

whose

as

intent

is

being

challenged

alt ~rnativ~s.

In a

emphasize the question
discriminatory

and

(b)

<

n

. 11.

refer

to

certain

"objective"

factors

as

having

place in the scheme of proof, possibly then (c)
that

a

decision motivated

in

part

a

preferred

allowing proof

by discriminatory

purpose

would have been reached for independent reasons.

An unrelated concluding word:
Appeals

embraced

the

clearly erroneous."

findings

of

In this case the Court of
the district court

as

"not

As I understand it, the Court opinion in

Swint--assigned but not yet circulated--will hold that this is
the correct standard.

If this Court does wish to reverse here,

it therefore must emphasize that there is
decision.

~

for the

This simply could be that the factors relied on were

too attenuated, as a matter of law, to support an inference of
the

fact

(although

of

discriminatory

intent.

injury was pleaded as a

fact,

Cf.

Warth

v.

Seldin

causal chain was too

attenuated as a matter of law to support the alleged conclusion
of fact).
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February 26, 1982 Conference
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(

Au~~

No. 80-2100

~

R(x;ERS,

Motion of Appellants for Leave to

Filea ~ly~

et al.

..,.,.

~·

v.
IDJX;E, et al.

SUMMARY:

~

Apps move to file on or before March 5, 1982 a "reply brief" in

response to briefs filed earlier by the appees an9 four civil rights
/"

organizations as amici curiae.

Oral arguments were heard in this case on

Tuesday, February 23, 1982.
CONTENTIONS:

Noting that a busy trial schedule precluded filing a reply

brief earlier, apps state that appees and amici have filed briefs totaling
almost 200 pages and apps have been limited to 50 pages; in addition, the
appees' brief contains a statement of facts grossly mistaking certain facts

-

and "distorted extracts quoted out of context."

(

f\Jv

·'

...

(MJtion at 1).

A

- 2 -

DISCUSSION:

Under Rule 35.3 of this Court's Rules, a "reply brief will

be received no later than one week before the date of oral argument, and only
by leave of court thereafter." Any reply brief was therefore due on
February 16, 1982.
9rguments are heard.

However, Rule 35.6 allows for filing briefs after
In this case, it seems appropriate to receive the apps'

brief which addresses the appees' and amici briefs which according to the apps
raise issues in addition to those argued by the parties.
The motion to file a brief on or before March 5, 1982 should be granted.
There is no response.

2/24/82

Schlueter

PJC

.
'

I

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDlM

c

February 26, 1982 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4
Motion of Appellants for Leave
to File a Delayed Reply Brief

No. 80-2100
R(X;ERS, et al.

v.
LOICE, et al.

SUMMARY AND CONTENTIONS:

Appees have filed a response to the apps'

motion to file a reply brief;l they argue that:
no grounds for filing the brief.

(2)

(1)

The apps have asserted

Being in trial for two months is

insufficient reason for not filing a reply brief earlier.
brief, not the appees', which contains distorted material.

(3) It is the apps'
(4)

Appees were

earlier denied permission to file a brief in excess of 50 pages; fairness
requires that apps' motion be denied.

(5) Apps' motion is not timely.

lThe motion was addressed in a Legal Office memo on February 24, 1982.

(

~~ ~~1 ~o~ o.s~fi¥ec-f-.
~

~

- 2 DISCUSSION:

As noted in the original Legal Office memo, the Rules of

this Court permit late Reply Briefs (by leave of the Court) and also briefs
following oral argument.

However denominated in this instance, it remains

appropriate to permit the apps to file a reply brief on or before March 5,
1982.

(
Schlueter
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81}-2100

QUENTIN ROGERS, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
HERMAN LODGE ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April - , 1982]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the at-large system of
elections in Burke County, Georgia violates the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of Burke County's black citizens.
JusTICE WHITE

I

Burke County is a large, predominately rural county located in eastern Georgia. Eight hundred and thirty-one
square miles in area, 1 it is approximately two-thirds the size
of the State of Rhode Island. According to the 1980 Census,
Burke County had a total population of 19,349, of whom
10,385, or 53.6%, were black. 2 The average age of blacks
living there is lower than the average age of whites and
therefore whites constitute a slight majority of the voting age
population. As of 1978, 6,373 persons were registered to
' United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
County and City Data Book 1977, p. 90.
' United States Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census
of Population and Housing, PHC8{}-V-12. March 1981, p. 5. In 1930,
Burke County had a total population of 29,224, of whom 12,698 or 78 percent were black. United States Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, II Characteristics of the Population, Pt. 2, p. 229 (1943). The percentage of blacks in the total population of Burke County has steadily
diminished over the last 50 years.
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vote in Burke County, of whom 38% were black. 3
The Burke County Board of Commissioners governs the
county. It was created in 1911, see Georgia Laws 1911 at
310--311, and consists of 5 members elected at large to concurrent 4-year terms by all qualified voters in the county.
The county has never been divided into districts, either for
the purpose of imposing a residency requirement on candidates or for the purpose of requiring candidates to be elected
by voters residing in a district. In order to be nominated or
elected, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast
in the primary or general election, and a runoff must be held
if no candidate receives a majority in the first primary or general election. Ga. Code § 34-1513 (1980). Each candidate
must run for a specific seat on the Board, Ga. Code
§ 34-1015 (1980), and a voter may vote only once for any candidate. No Negro has ever been elected to the Burke
County Board of Commissioners.
Eight black citizens of Burke County filed this suit in 1976
in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia. The suit was brought on behalf of all black citizens in Burke County. The class was certified in 1977. The
complaint alleged that the County's system of at-large elections violated appellees' First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment rights, as well as their rights under 42
U. S. C. § § 1971, 1973, and 1983 by diluting the voting power
of black citizens. Following a bench trial at which both sides
introduced extensive evidence, the court issued an order on
September 28, 1978 stating that appellees were entitled to
prevail and ordering that Burke County be divided into 5 districts for purposes of electing County Commissioners. App.
to Juris. Statement 62a. The court later issued detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated that
while the present method of electing County Commissioners
was "racially neutral when adopted, [it] is being maintained
3

App. to Juris. Statement 72a.
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for invidious purposes" in violation of appellees' Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment rights. I d., at 71a, 96a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Lodge v. Buxton,
639 F. 2d 1358 (CA5 1981). It stated that while the proceedings in the District Court took place prior to the decision in
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), the District Court correctly anticipated Mobile and required appellees to prove
that the at-large voting system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. 639 F. 2d, at 1375-1376. The Court
of Appeals also held that the District Court's findings not
only were not clearly erroneous, but its conclusion that the
at-large system was maintained for invidious purposes was
"virtually mandated by the overwhelming proof." I d., at
1380. We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - (1981), and now affirm. 4
II
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to
minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the
district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic,
economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect
several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts. The minority's voting power in a
multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting
occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority
lines. While multimember districts have been challenged for
"their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge
minorities and to overrepresent the winning party," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 158-159 (1971), this Court has
repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se.
' The District Court's judgment was stayed pending appeal to the Court
of Appeals. 439 U. S. 948 (1978). The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate on April 6, 1981, pending disposition of the case here.
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Mobile v. Bolden,...supra, at 66; White v. Regester, 412 U. S.
755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 142. The
Court has recognized, however, that multimember districts
violate the Fourteenth Amendment if "conceived or operated
as purposeful devices to further ... racial discrimination" by
minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of
racial elements in the voting population. Whitcomb v.
Chavis, supra at 149; White v. Regester, supra, at 765.
Cases charging that multimember districts unconstitutionally
dilute the voting strength of racial minorities are thus subject
to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229
(1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), made it
clear that in order for the Equal Protection Clause to be violated, "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240.
Neither case involved voting dilution, but the Court observed
that the requirement that racially discriminatory purpose or
intent be proven applies to voting cases by relying upon,
among others, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), a
districting case, to illustrate that a showing of discriminatory
intent has long been required in all types of cases arising
under the Equal Protection Clause. Arlington Heights,
supra, at 265; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 240.
Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis both rejected
the notion that a law is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of
one race than another. Arlington Heights, supra, at 265;
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 242. However, both cases
recognized that discriminatory intent need not be proven by
direct evidence. "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears
more heavily on one race than another." Ibid. Thus deter-
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mining the existence of a discriminatory purpose "demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, at
266.
In Mobile v. Bolden, supra, the Court was called upon to
apply these principles to the at-large election system in Mobile, Alabama. Mobile is governed by three commissioners
who exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative
power in the municipality. 446 U. S., at 59. Each candidate for the City Commission runs for one of three numbered
posts in an at-large election and can only be elected by a majority vote. Ibid. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf
of all Negro citizens of Mobile alleging that the at-large
scheme diluted their voting strength in violation of several
statutory and constitutional provisions. The District Court
concluded that the at-large system "violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by improperly restricting their
access to the political process," 423 F. Supp. 384, 399 (SD
Ala. 1976), and ordered that the commission form of government be replaced by a mayor and a nine-member City Council
elected from single-member districts. !d., at 404. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. 571 F. 2d 238 (CA5 1978). This
Court reversed.
Justice Stewart, writing for himself and three other Justices, noted that to prevail in their contention that the atlarge voting system violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs had to prove the system was "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to
further racial . . . discrimination." 446 U. S., at 66, quoting
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149. 5 Such a require• With respect to the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality held that the
Amendment prohibits only direct, purposefully discriminatory interference
with the freedom of Negroes to vote. "Having found that Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hindrance,' the District Court and Court of
Appeals were in error in believing that the appellants invaded the protec-
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ment "is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if
there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
446 U. S., at 66, and White v. Regester is consistent with that
principle. Id., at 69. Another Justice agreed with the
standard of proof recognized by the plurality. Id., at 101
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
The plurality went on to conclude that the District Court
had failed to comply with this standard. The District Court
had analyzed plaintiffs' claims in light of the standard which
had been set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297
(CA5 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll
Parrish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1975) (per
curiam). 6 Zimmer set out a list of factors 7 gleaned from
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, and White v. Regester, supra,
tion of [the Fifteenth] Amendment in the present case." Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 65 (1980). Three Justices disagreed with the plurality's basis for putting aside the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 84 n. 3
(STEVENS, J., concurring); Id., at 102 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Id., at
12&-135 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We express no view on the application of the Fifteenth Amendment to this case.
The plurality noted that plaintiffs' claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, added nothing to their
Fifteenth Amendment claim because the "legislative history of § 2 makes
clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the
Fifteenth Amendment itself." I d., at 60-61.
6
We specifically affirmed the judgment below "without approval of the
constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals." 424 U. S., at
638.
' The primary factors listed in Zimmer include a lack of minority access
to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to
minority interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for
multi-member or at-large districting, and the existence of past discrimination which precludes effective participation in the elector process. 485
F. 2d, at 1305. Factors which enhance the proof of voting dilution are the
existence of large districts, anti-single shot voting provisions, and the absence of any provision for at-large candidates to run from geographic subdistricts. Ibid.
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that a court should consider in assessing the constitutionality
of at-large and multimember district voting schemes.
Under Zimmer, voting dilution is established "upon proof of
the existence of an aggregate of these factors." 485 F. 2d, at
1305.

The plurality in Mobile was of the view that Zimmer was
"decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary
to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient." 446 U. S., at 71. The plurality observed that while "the presence of the indicia relied on in
Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose," the mere existence of those criteria is not a substitute
for a finding of discriminatory purpose. I d., at 73. The
District Court's standard in Mobile was likewise flawed. Finally, the plurality concluded that the evidence upon which
the lower courts had relied was "insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case."
Ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS rejected the intentional discrimination standard but concluded that the proof failed to satisfy
the legal standard that in his view was the applicable rule.
He therefore concurred in the judgment of reversal. Four
other Justices, however, thought the evidence sufficient to
satisfy the purposeful discrimination standard. One of
them, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, nevertheless concurred in the
Court's judgment because he believed an erroneous remedy
had been imposed.
Because the District Court in the present case employed
the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer, it is urged that
its judgment is infirm for the same reasons that led to the reversal in Mobile. We do not agree. First, and fundamentally, we are unconvinced that the District Court in this
case applied the wrong legal standard. Not only was the
District Court's decision rendered a considerable time after
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, but the trial
judge also had the benefit of Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d 209
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(CA5 1978), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
assessed the impact of Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights and concluded that "a showing of racially motivated
discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection
voting dilution claim ... " 571 F. 2d, at 219. The court
stated that "[t]he ultimate issue in a case alleging unconstitutional dilution of votes of a racial group is whether the districting plan under attack exists because it was intended to
diminish or dilute the political efficacy of that group." I d.,
at 226. The Court of Appeals also explained that although
the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer were important
considerations in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those factors. "The task before the fact finder is to determine, under
all the relevant facts, in whose favor the 'aggregate' of the
evidence preponderates. This determination is peculiarly
dependent upon the facts of each case." I d., at 224.
The District Court referred to N evett v. Sides and demonstrated its understanding of the controlling standard by observing that a determination of discriminatory intent is "a
requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution" under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. App. to Juris.
Statement 68a. Furthermore, while recognizing that the
evidentiary factors identified in Zimmer were to be considered, the District Court was aware that it was "not limited in
its determination only to the Zimmer factors" but could consider other relevant factors as well. I d., at 70a. The District Court then proceeded to deal with what it considered to
be the relevant proof and concluded that the at-large scheme
of electing commissioners, "although racially neutral when
adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes." I d.,
at 71a. That system "while neutral in origin . . . has been
subverted to invidious purposes." !d., at 90a. For the
most part, the District Court dealt with the evidence in
terms of the factors set out in Zimmer and its progeny, but
as the Court of Appeals stated:

j
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"Judge Alaimo employed the constitutionally required
standard ... [and] did not treat the Zimmer criteria as
absolute, but rather considered them only to the extent
they were relevant to the question of discriminatory intent." 639 F. 2d, at 1376.
Although a tenable --argument can be made to the contrary,
we are not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the District Court applied the proper legal
standard.

III
A
We are also unconvinced that we should disturb the District Court's finding that the at-large system in Burke
County was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population. In White
v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 769-770, we stated that we were
not inclined to overturn the District Court's factual findings,
"representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely
local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar County
multimember district in the light of past and present reality,
political and otherwise." See also Columbus Board of Education v. Penrick, 443 U. S. 449, 468 (1979) (CHIEF JUSTICE
BURGER, concurring). Our recent decision in PullmanStandard v. Swint, - - U. S. - - (1982), emphasizes the
deference Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 requires reviewing courts
to give a trial court's findings of fact. "Rule 52 broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude
certain categories of factual findings .... " Op. at 13. The
Court held that the issue of whether the differential impact of
a seniority system resulted from an intent to discriminate on
racial grounds "is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52's
clearly erroneous standard." Op. at 14. The Swint Court
also noted that issues of intent are commonly treated as fac-
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tual matters. Id., at 14-15. We are of the view that the
same clearly-erroneous standard applies to the trial court's
finding in this case that the at-large system in Burke County
is ·being maintained for discriminatory purposes, as well as to
the court's subsidiary findings of fact. The Court of Appeals
did not hold any of the District Court's findings of fact to be
clearly erroneous, and this Court has frequently noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower
courts. See, e. g., Berenyi v. Information Director, 385
U. S. 630, 635 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403,
408-409 (1962); Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271,
275 (1949). We agree with the Court of Appeals that on the
record before us, none of the factual findings are clearly
erroneous.
B
The District Court found that blacks have always made up
a substantial majority of the population in Burke County,
App. to Juris. Statement 66a n. 3, but that they are a distinct
minority of the registered voters. I d., at 71a-72a. There
was also overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial
lines. Id., at 72a-73a. Hence, although there had been
black candidates, no black had ever been elected to the Burke
County commission. These facts bear heavily on the issue of
purposeful discrimination. Voting along racial lines allows
those elected to ignore black interests without fear of political consequences, and without bloc voting the minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of their race.
Because it is sensible to expect that at least some blacks
would have been elected in Burke County, the fact that none
have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful
exclusion. See White v. Regester, supra, at 766.
Under our cases, however, such facts are insufficient in
themselves to prove purposeful discrimination absent other
evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of
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their choice. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430
U. S. 144, 167 (1977); White v. Regester, supra, at 76~766;
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149; see also Mobile v.
Bolden, supra, at 66 (plurality opinion). Both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals thought the supporting proof
in this case was sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination. The supporting evidence was organized primarily around the factors which Nevett v. Sides,
supra, had deemed relevant to the issue of intentional
discrimination. These factors were primarily those suggested in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra.
The District Court began by determining the impact of
past discrimination on the ability of blacks to participate effectively in the political process. Past discrimination was
found to contribute to low black voter registration because
prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks had been denied access by means such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and
white primaries. The result was that "Black suffrage in
Burke County was virtually non-existent." App. to Juris.
Statement 71a. Black voter registration in Burke County
has increased following the Voting Rights Act to the point
that some 38 per cent of blacks eligible to vote are registered
to do so. I d., at 72a. On that basis the District Court inferred that "past discrimination has had an adverse effect on
black voter registration which lingers to this date." Ibid.
Past discrimination against blacks in education also had the
same effect. Not only did Burke County schools discriminate against blacks as recently as 1969, but some schools still
remain essentially segregated and blacks as a group have
completed less formal education than whites. I d., at 74a.
The District Court found further evidence of exclusion
from the political process. Past discrimination had prevented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic
Party affairs and in primary elections. Until this law suit
was filed, there had never been a black member of the
County Executive Committee of the Democratic Party.
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There were also property ownership requirements that made
it difficult for blacks to serve as chief registrar in the county.
There had also been discrimination in the selection of grand
jurors, the hiring of county employees, and in the appointments to boards and committees which oversee the county
government. Id., at 74-76a. The District Court thus concluded that historical discrimination had restricted the
present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in the
political process. Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination,
particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence
shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized,
that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made
illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they were replaced
by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face,
serve to maintain the status quo.
Extensive evidence was cited by the District Court to support its finding that elected officials of Burke County have
been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black
community, 8 which increases the likelihood that the political
process was not equally open to blacks. This evidence
ranged from the effects of past discrimination which still
haunt the county courthouse to the infrequent appointment of
blacks to county boards and committees; the overtly discriminatory pattern of paving county roads; the reluctance of the
county to remedy black complaints, which forced blacks to
take legal action to obtain school and grand jury desegregation; and the role played by the County Commissioners in the
incorporation of an all-white private school to which they do8
The Court of Appeals held that "proof of unresponsiveness by the public body in question to the group claiming injury" is an essential element of
a claim of voting dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. 639 F . 2d, at
1375. Under our cases, however, unresponsiveness is an important element but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in
determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred.
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nated public funds for the purchase of band uniforms. I d., at
77a-82a.
The District Court also considered the depressed socio-economic status of Burke County blacks. It found that proportionately more blacks than whites have incomes below the
poverty level. I d., at 83a. Nearly 53 per cent of all black
families living in Burke County had incomes equal to or less
than three-fourths of a poverty-level income. Ibid. Not
only have blacks completed less formal education than
whites, but the education they have received "was qualitatively inferior to a marked degree." I d., at 84a. Blacks
tend to receive less pay than whites, even for similar work,
and they tend to be employed in menial jobs more often than
whites. I d., at 85a. Seventy-three per cent of houses occupied by blacks lacked all or some plumbing facilities; only 16
per cent of white-occupied houses suffered the same deficiency. Ibid. The District Court concluded that the depressed socio-economic status of blacks results in part from
"the lingering effects of past discrimination." Ibid.
Although finding that the state policy behind the at-large
electoral system in Burke County was "neutral in origin," the
District Court concluded that the policy "has been subverted
for invidious purposes." Id., at 90a. As a practical matter,
maintenance of the state statute providing for at-large elections in Burke County is determined by Burke County's state
representatives, for the legislature defers to their wishes on
matters of purely local application. The court found that
Burke County's state representatives "have retained a system which has minimized the ability of Burke County blacks
to participate in the political system." Ibid.
The trial court considered, in addition, several factors
which this Court has indicated enhance the tendency of
multimember districts to minimize the voting strength of racial minorities. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at
143--144. It found that the sheer geographic size of the
county, which is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode Island,
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"has made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places
or to campaign for office." I d., at 91a. The court concluded, as a matter oflaw, that the size of the county tends to
impair the access of blacks to the political process. I d., at
92a. The majority vote requirement, Ga. Code § 34-1513
(1980), was found "to submerge the will of the minority" and
thus "deny the minority's access to the system." I d., at 92a.
The court also found the requirement that candidates run for
specific seats, Ga. Code § 34-1015 (1980), enhances respondent's lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political
group from concentrating on a single candidate. Because
Burke County has no residency requirement, "[a]ll candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in lilly-white neighborhoods. To that extent, the denial of access becomes enhanced." I d., at 93a.
None of the District Court's findings underlying its ultimate finding of intentional discrimination appears to us to be
clearly erroneous; and as we have said, we decline to overturn the essential finding of the District Court, agreed to by
the Court of Appeals, that the at-large system in Burke
County has been maintained for the purpose of denying
blacks equal access to the political processes in the county.
As in White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 767, the District
Court's findings were "sufficient to sustain [its] judgment
... and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb them."
IV
We also find no reason to overturn the relief ordered by the
District Court. Neither the District Court nor the Court of
Appeals discerned any special circumstances that would militate against /utilizing single-member districts. Where "a
constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not
'exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the
'condition that offends the Constitution.'" Milliken v. Brad-
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ley, 433 U. S. 267, 282 (1977), quoting Milliken v. Bradley,

418 u. s. 717, 738 (1974). 9
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

• Appellants contend that the District Court should not have divided
Burke County into 5 districts but should have allowed appellants to devise
a plan for subdividing the County and to submit their plan for preclearance
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c. This contention was not raised in the Court of Appeals and was
not addressed by that court. We therefore do not address it. See
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970).
Appellants also contend that the doctrine of unconstitutional dilution of
voting rights arising from an at-large election system does not apply to
county governing bodies. We find no merit to this contention, having previously affirmed a judgment that at-large elections for the governing body
of a parish (county) unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength. East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976).
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he says.
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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Our legacy of racial discrimination has left its scars on
Burke County, Georgia. 1 The record in this case amply supports the conclusion that the governing officials of Burke
County have repeatedly denied black citizens rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution. No one could legitimately question
the validity of remedial measures, whether legislative or judicial, designed to prohibit discriminatory conduct by public
officials and to guarantee that black citizens are effectively
afforded the rights to register and to vote. Public roads may
not be paved only in areas in which white citizens live; 2 black
citizens may not be denied employment opportunities in
county government; 3 segregated schools may not be
maintained. 4

~

I

' Certain vestiges of discrimination-although clearly not the most
pressing problems facing black citizens today-are a haunting reminder of
an all too recent period of our nation's history. The District Court found
that a segregated laundromat is operated within a few blocks of the county
courthouse; at the courthouse itself, faded paint over restroom doors does
not entirely conceal the words "colored" and "white."
2
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 (MD Fla. 1981).
' 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2.
'Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483.
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Nor, in my opinion, could there be any doubt about the constitutionality of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that
would require Burke County and other covered jurisdictions
to abandon specific kinds of at-large voting schemes that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. "As against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U. S. 301, 324. It might indeed be wise policy to accelerate the transition of minority groups to a position of political power commensurate with their voting strength by
amending the Act to prohibit the use of multimember districts in all covered jurisdictions.
The Court's decision today, however, is not based on either
its own conception of sound policy or any statutory command.
The decision rests entirely on the Court's interpretation of
the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Despite my
sympathetic appraisal of the Court's laudable goals, I am unable to agree with its approach to the constitutional issue that
is presented. In my opinion, this case raises questions that
encompass more than the immediate plight of disadvantaged
black citizens. I believe the Court errs by holding the structure of the local governmental unit unconstitutional without
identifying an acceptable, judicially-manageable standard for
adjudicating cases of this kind.
I

The Court's entry into the business of electoral reapportionment in 1962 was preceded by a lengthy and scholarly debate over the role the judiciary legitimately could play in
what Justice Frankfurter described in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U. S. 549, as a "political thicket." 5 In that case, decided
In his much criticized opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,
Justice Frankfmter wrote:
5
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in 1946, the Court declined to entertain a challenge to singlemember congressional districts in Illinois that had been created in 1901 and had become grossly unequal by reason of the
great growth in urban population. 6 In dissent, Justice Black
advocated the use of a state-wide, at-large election of representatives; he argued that an at-large election "has an element of virtue that the more convenient method does not
have-namely, it does not discriminate against some groups
to favor others, it gives all the people an equally effective
voice in electing their representatives as is essential under a
free government, and it is constitutional." /d., at 574.
In 1962, the Court changed course. In another challenge
"Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring
courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the
people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.
"Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. The Constitution has
many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly
fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action.
Thus, 'on Demand of the executive Authority,' Art. IV, § 2, of a State it is
the duty of a sister State to deliver up a fugitive from justice. But the
fulfilment of this duty cannot be judicially enforced. Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66. The duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully
executed cannot be brought under legal compulsion, Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475. Violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of
government in States cannot be challenged in the courts. Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118. The Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity
of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of
the people in exercising their political rights." 328 U. S., at 553-554, 556.
6
The districts ranged in population from 112,000 to 900,000 persons.
Id., at 557.

<i
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to the constitutionality of a 1901 districting statute, it held
that the political question doctrine did not foreclose judicial
review. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186. That decision represents one of the great landmarks in the history of this Court's
jurisprudence.
Two aspects of the Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr are of
special relevance to the case the Court decides today. First,
the Court's scholarly review of the political question doctrine
focused on the dominant importance of satisfactory standards
for judicial determination. 7 Second, the Court's articulation
of the relevant constitutional standard made no reference to
subjective intent. 8 The host of cases that have arisen in the

1
~

1

7
The Court stated that the "nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers." 369 U. S., at 210. It
emphasized, however, that "the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination" was a dominant consideration in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U. S. 433, 454-455; that whether a foreign relations question is justiciable
turns, in part, on "its susceptibility to judicial handling"; that in the presence of clearly definable criteria for decision "the political question barrier
falls away"; and that "even in private litigation which directly implicates no
feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards
and the drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political departments' determination of dates of hostilities' beginning and ending." 369 U. S., at 210, 211, 214. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, was distinguished, in part, because that case involved "the lack of criteria by
which a court could determine which form of government was republican";
the Court stated that "the only significance that Luther could have for our
immediate purposes is in its holding that the Guaranty Clause is not a
repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could utilize independently in order to identify a State's lawful government." 369 U. S.,
at 222, 223. In concluding that the reapportionment question before it
was justiciable, the Court emphasized that it would not be necessary "to
enter upon policy determinations for which judicia)ly manageable standards are lacking." ld., at 226.
• The Court simply stated:
"Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must,
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
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wake of Baker v. Carr have shared these two characteristics.
They have formulated, refined, and applied a judicially manageable standard that has become known as the one-person,
one-vote rule; they have attached no significance to the subjective intent of the decisionmakers who adopted or maintained the official rule under attack.
In approaching the novel case it decides today, the Court
assumes that the governing standard for decision has been
well established by our prior cases. The Court's approach is
straightforward; it simply states that "a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause." Ante, at 4 (emphasis in original). This blanket assertion is simply incorrect. 9
For the Court has repeatedly identified the criteria for determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause
without any reference to subjective motivation. 10
action." Id., at 226.
• As noted above, the many cases applying the one-person, one-vote rule
arose under the Equal Protection Clause and did not involve a showing of
discriminatory intent. Unequal districts must be reapportioned whether
they are the product of unanticipated shifts in population or an attempt to
dilute the voting power of minority citizens.
1
°For example, in his opinion for the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330, 335, JUSTICE MARSHALL wrote:
"To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look,
in essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question;
the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental
interests asserted in support of the classification."
And in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, at the outset of its analysis of the
question whether Ohio election laws impairing a new political party's access to the state ballot violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
stated:
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection
Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification." I d., at 30.
In sum, the standard by which an equal protection challenge is measured
cannot be determined without identifying the substantive right that the

<

l

j
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In reviewing the constitutionality of the structure of a local
government, two quite different methods of analysis could be
employed. The Court might identify the specific features of
the government that raise constitutional concerns and decide
whether, singly or in combination, they are valid. This is
the approach the Court has used in testing the constitutionality of rules conditioning the right to vote on payment of a poll
tax, 11 imposing burdens on independent candidates, 12 denying
new residents or members of the Armed Forces the right to
vote, 13 prohibiting cross-overs in party primaries, 14 requiring
political candidates to pay filing fees, 15 and disadvantaging
minority parties in presidential elections. 16 In none of these
standard is designed to protect. If the right is merely a right to be free
from improper motivations, a subjective standard obviously is appropriate.
But if the Equal Protection Clause provides certain rights that are independent of motivation-such as the right to have one's vote count the same
as that of any other voter, see n. 9, supra-than a subjective standard
clearly is not appropriate. See n. 24, infra.
11
Hmper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663. The Court
concluded that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax." Id., at
666. "To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor." !d., at 668.
In dissent, Justice Black noted: "It should be pointed out at once that the
Court's decision is to no extent based on a finding that the Virginia law as
written or applied is being used as a device or mechanism to deny Negro
citizens of Virginia the right to vote on account of their color." !d., at 672.
12
Storer v. B1'0wn, 415 U. S. 724. The Court stated that, in determining the constitutionality of eligibility requirements for independent candidates, the "inevitable question for judgment" is "could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature
requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will
succeed in getting on the ballot?" Id., at 742. See Mandel v. Bradley,
432 U. S. 173, 177; id., at 181 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 795.
13
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89.
14
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51.
15
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134.
16
Willimas v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.
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cases did the validity of the electoral procedure turn on
whether the legislators who enacted the rule subjectively intended to discriminate against minority voters. Under the
approach employed by the Court in those cases, the objective
circumstances that led to a declaration that an election procedure was unconstitutional would invalidate a similar law
wherever it might be found.
Alternatively, the Court could employ a subjective approach under which the constitutionality of a challenged procedure depends entirely on federal judges' appraisals of the
reasons why particular localities have chosen to govern themselves in a particular way. The Constitution would simply
protect a right to have an electoral machinery established
and maintained without the influence of impermissible factors. Constitutional challenges to identical procedures in
neighboring communities could produce totally different results, for the subjective motivations of the legislators who enacted the procedures-or at least the admissible evidence
that might be discovered concerning such motivation-could
be quite different.
In deciding the question presented in this case, the Court
abruptly rejects the former approach and considers only the
latter. It starts from the premise that Burke County's atlarge method of electing its five county commissioners is, on
its face, unobjectionable. The otherwise valid system is unconstitutional, however, because it makes it more difficult for
the minority to elect commissioners and because the majority
that is now in power has maintained the system for that very
reason. Two factors are apparently of critical importance:
(1) the intent of the majority to maintain control; and (2) the
racial character of the minority.
I am troubled by each aspect of the Court's analysis. In
my opinion, the question whether Burke County's at-large
system may survive scrutiny under a purely objective analysis is not nearly as easy to answer as the Court implies. As-

'

·I'

I
'
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80-2100-DISSENT
8

ROGERSv.LODGE

suming, however, that the system is otherwise valid, I do not
believe that the subjective intent of the persons who adopted
the system in 1911, or the intent of those who have since declined to change it, can determine its constitutionality.
Even if the intent of the political majority were the controlling constitutional consideration, I could not agree that the
only political groups that are entitled to protection under the
Court's rule are those defined by racial characteristics.
II

At-large voting systems generally tend to maximize the political power of the majority. See ante, at 3Y There are,

..

17
In the words of Chancellor Kent, the requirement of districting "was
recommended by the wisdom and justice of giving, as far as possible, to the
local subdivisions of the people of each state, a due influence in the choice of
representatives, so as not to leave the aggregate minority of the people in a
state, though approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpowered by the combined action of the numerical majority, without any voice
whatever in the national councils." 1 Kent, Commentaries (12th ed.,
1873) *230-231, n. (c). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 105, n. 3
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 158-160.
The challenge to multimember or at-large districts is, of course, quite
different from the challenge to the value of individual votes considered in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. An at-large system is entirely consistent with the one-person, one-vote rule developed in that case. As Justice
Stewart noted in Mobile, in considering the applicability of Reynolds and
the cases that followed it:
"Those cases established that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
right of each voter to 'have his vote weighted equally with those of all other
citizens.' 377 U. S., at 576. The Court recognized that a voter's right to
'have an equally effective voice' in the election of representatives is impaired where representation is not apportioned substantially on a population basis. In such cases, the votes of persons in more populous districts
carry less weight than do those of persons in smaller districts. There can
be, of course, no claim that the 'one person, one vote' principle has been
violated in this case, because the city of Mobile is a unitary electoral district and the Commission elections are conducted at large. It is therefore
obvious that nobody's vote had been 'diluted' in the sense in which that
word was used in the Reynolds case.'' 446 U. S., at 77-78 (plurality
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however, many types of at-large electoral schemes. Three
features of Burke County's electoral system are noteworthy,
not in my opinion because they shed special light on the subjective intent of certain unidentified people, but rather because they make it especially difficult for a minority candidate to win an election. First, although the qualifications
and the duties of the office are identical for all five commissioners, each runs for a separately designated position. 18
Second, in order to be elected, each commissioner must receive a majority of all votes cast in the primary and in the
general election; if the leading candidate receives only a plurality, a run-off election must be held. Third, there are no
residency requirements; thus, all candidates could reside in a
single, all-white neighborhood. 19
Even if one assumes that a system of local government in
which power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of
persons elected from the community at large is an acceptable-or perhaps even a preferred-form of municipal government, 20 it is not immediately apparent that these addiopinion).
See also id., at 83 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
18
This feature distinguishes Burke County's at-large electoral system
from the municipal commission form of government popularized by reformers shortly after the turn of the century and known as the Galveston Plan
or the Des Moines Plan. See n. 20, infra.
"Other features of certain at-large electoral schemes that make it more
difficult for a minority group to elect a favored candidate when bloc voting
occurs-prohibitions against cumulative and incomplete voting-are not involved in this case. Prohibitions against cumulative or partial voting are
generally, inapplicable in electoral schemes involving numbered posts.
20
"During its evolution as a progressive solution to municipal problems,
the commission format was variously known as the Galveston plan, the
Texas idea, and the Des Moines plan. Since Galveston invented the basic
organization and Des Moines popularized the addition of related reform
techniques, the new type of government is probably best described as the
Galveston-Des Moines plan. So popular did the new idea become that
towns could reap advertising benefits for being in the forefront of munici-
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tional features that help to perpetuate the power of an
entrenched majority are either desireable or legitimate. 21 If
the only purpose these features serve-particularly when
viewed in combination-is to assist a dominant party to maintain its political power, they are no more legitimate than the
Tennessee districts described in Baker v. Carr as "no policy,
but simply arbitrary and capricious action." 369 U. S., at
226 (emphasis in original). Unless these features are inde-

.!

pal innovation if they used the commission plan. Consequently, some cities boasted that they had the system, knowing full well that their charters
had little resemblance to Galveston's. But there were certain essentials
necessary before a city could claim commission status. Benjamin DeWitt,
an early historian of the progressive movement, explained:
"In every case, however, no matter how much charters may differ as to
minor details, they have certain fundamental features in common. These
fundamental features of commission charters are four:
"1. Authority and responsibility are centralized.
"2. The number of men in whom this authority and this responsibility
are vested is small.
"3. These few men are elected from the city at large and not by wards or
districts.
"4. Each man is at the head of a single department.
"The most radical departure the new scheme made was the combination
of legislative and executive functions in one body. The plan disregarded
the federal model of separation of powers. Sitting together, the commission was a typical policy- and ordinance-making council; but, separately,
each commissioner administered a specific department on a day-to-day
basis. The original Galveston charter provided for a mayor-president plus
commissioners of finance and revenue, waterworks and sewerage, streets
and public property, and fire and police. Later commission cities followed
a similar division of responsibility." Rice, Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement in America, 1901-1920, pp. xiii-xiv (Univ.
of Texas Press 1977).
" It is noteworthy that these features apparently characterize many
governmental units in jurisdictions that have been subjected to the strictures of the Voting Rights Act as the result of prior practices that excluded
black citizens from the electoral process. See generally, The Voting
Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals, A Report of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights, 38-50 (1981).
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pendently justified, they may be invalid simply because there
is no legitimate justification for their impact on minority participation in elections. 22
In this case, appellees have not argued-presumably because they assumed that this Court's many references to the
requirement of proving an improper motive in equal protection cases are controlling in this new context-that the special features of Burke County's at-large system have such an
adverse impact on the minority's opportunity to participate in
the political process that this type of government deprives
the minority of equal protection of the law. Nor have the
appellants sought to identify legitimate local policies that
might justify the use of such rules. As a result, this record
does not provide an adequate basis for determining the validity of Burke County's governmental structure on the basis of
traditional objective standards. 23
If the governmental structure were itself found to lack a
legitimate justification, inquiry into subjective intent would
clearly be unnecessary. As JUSTICE MARSHALL stated in
22
No group has a right to proportional representation. See Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75-76 (plurality opinion); id., at 122 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting). But in a representative democracy, meaningful participation
by minority groups in the electoral process is essential to ensure that representative bodies are responsive to the entire electorate. For this reason, a challenged electoral procedure may not be justified solely on the
ground that it serves to reduce the ability of a minority group to participate effectively in the electoral process.
23
The record nevertheless does indicate that the validity of the at-large
system itself need not be decided in this case. For it is apparent that
elimination of the majority run-off requirement and the numbered posts
would enable a well-organized minority to elect one or two candidates to
the county board. That consequence could be achieved without replacing
the at-large system itself with five single-member districts. In other
words, minority access to the political process could be effected by invalidating specific rules that impede that access and without changing the basic structure of the local governmental unit. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 80 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
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his dissent in Mobile: "Whatever may be the merits of applying motivational analysis to the allocation of constitutionally
gratuitous benefits, that approach is completely misplaced
where, as here, it is applied to the distribution of a constitutionally protected interest." 446 U. S., at 121. 24 Under the
Court's analysis, however, the characteristics of the particular form of government under attack are virtually irrelevant;
the Court states that a showing of discriminatory intent is required in all equal protection cases. Ante, at 4. Thus, not
only would the Court's approach uphold an arbitrary-but
not invidious-system that lacked independent justification,
it would invalidate-if a discriminatory intent were proveda local rule that would be perfectly acceptable absent a showing of invidious intent. The Court's standard applies not
"'It is worth repeating the statement of Professor Ely noted by JUSTICE
MARSHALL:

1

i

~

"The danger I see is the somewhat different one that the Court, in its newfound enthusiasm for motivation analysis, will seek to export it to fields
where it has no business. It therefore cannot be emphasized too strongly
that analysis of motivation is appropriate only to claims of improper discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitutionally gratuitous
(that is, benefits to which people are not entitled as a matter of substantive
constitutional right). In such cases the covert employment of a principle
of selection that could not constitutionally be employed overtly is equally
unconstitutional. However, where what is denied is something to which
the complainant has a substantive constitutional right-either because it
is granted by the terms of the Constitution, or because it is essential to the
effective functioning of a democratic government-the reasons it was denied are irrelevant. It may become important in court what justifications
counsel for the state can articulate in support of its denial or non-provision,
but the reasons that actually inspired the denial never can: To have a right
to something is to have a claim on it irrespective of why it is denied. It
would be a tragedy of the first order were the Court to expand its burgeoning awareness of the relevance of motivation into the thoroughly mistaken
notion that a denial of a constitutional right does not count as such unless it
was intentional." Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis,
15 San Diego L. Rev. 1155, 1160-1161 (1978) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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only to Burke County and to multimember districts, but to
any other form of government as well.

III
Ever since I joined the Court, I have been concerned about
the Court's emphasis on subjective intent as a criterion for
constitutional adjudication. 25 Although that criterion is often
regarded as a restraint on the exercise of judicial power, it
may in fact provide judges with a tool for exercising power
that otherwise would be confined to the legislature. 2ti My
principal concern with the subjective intent standard, however, is unrelated to the quantum of power it confers upon
the judiciary. It is based on the quality of that power. For
in the long run constitutional adjudication that is premised on
a case-by-case appraisal of the subjective intent of local
decisionmakers cannot possibly satisfy the requirement of
impartial administration of the law that is embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The facts of this case illustrate the ephemeral character of
a constitutional standard that focuses on subjective intent.
When the suit was filed in 1976, approximately 58 percent of
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, I wrote:
"Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly
true in the case of governmental action which is frequently the product of
compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. It is
unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination
to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decision maker or, conversely,
to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A
law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted
for it." Id., at 253 (concurring opinion).
26
See Miller, If "The Devil Himself Knows Not the Mind of Man," How
Possibly Can Judges Know the Motivation of Legislators? 15 San Diego
L. Rev. 1167, 1170 (1978).
25

.,
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the population of Burke County was black and approximately
42 percent was white. Because black citizens had been denied access to the political process-through means that have
since been outlawed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965-and
because there had been insufficient time to enable the registration of black voters to overcome the history of past injustice, the majority of registered voters in the county were
white. The at-large electoral system therefore served, as a
result of the presence of bloc voting, to maintain white control of the local government. Whether it would have continued to do so would have depended on a mix of at least three
different factors-the continuing increase in voter registration among blacks, the continuing exodus of black residents
from the county, and the extent to which racial bloc voting
continued to dominate local politics.
If those elected officials in control of the political machinery had formed the judgment that these factors created a
likelihood that a bloc of black voters was about to achieve sufficient strength to elect an entirely new administration, they
might have decided to abandon the at-large system and substitute five single-member districts with the boundary lines
drawn to provide a white majority in three districts and a
black majority in only two. Under the Court's intent standard, such a change presumably would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is ironic that the remedy ordered by the
District Court fits that pattern precisely. 27
"'The following table shows a breakdown of the population of the districts in the plan selected by the District Court as to race and voting age:
Voting Age
Black Voting Age
White Voting Age
Population
Population (%)
Population (%)
2,048
1,482 (72.4)
556 (27.6)
1
2,029
1,407 (69.3)
2
622 (30. 7)
2,115
978 (46.2)
1,137 (53.8)
3
947 (44.6)
1,175 (55.4)
2,112
4
2,217
803 (36.2)
1,414 (63.8)
5
See Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F. 2d 1358, 1361, n. 4 (CA5 1981).
District
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If votes continue to be cast on a racial basis, the judicial
remedy virtually guarantees that whites will continue to control a majority of seats on the county board. It is at least
possible that white control of the political machinery has been
frozen by judicial decree at a time when increased black voter
registration might have led to a complete change of administration. Since the federal judge's intent was unquestionably
benign rather than invidious-and, unlike that of state officials, is presumably not subject in any event to the Court's
standard-that result has been accomplished without violating the Federal Constitution.
In the future, it is not inconceivable that the white officials
who are likely to remain in power under the District Court's
plan will desire to perpetuate that system and to continue to
control a majority of seats on the county commission. Under
this Court's standard, if some of those officials harbor such an
intent for an "invidious" reason, the District Court's plan will
itself become unconstitutional. It is not clear whether the
invidious intent would have to be shared by all three white
commissioners, by merely a majority of two, or by simply one
if he were influential. It is not clear whether the issue would
be affected by the intent of the two black commissioners, who
might fear that a return to an at-large system would undermine the certainty of two black seats. 28 Of course, if the subjective intent of these officials were such as to mandate a
change to a governmental structure that would permit black
voters to elect an all-black commission-and if black voters
did so-those black officials could not harbor an intent to
"'In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, a group of minority voters in
New York City challenged a districting scheme that placed most minority
voters in one of four districts. They sought "a more even distribution of
minority groups among the four congressional districts." /d., at 58. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell intervened in the lawsuit and argued
strenuously "that the kind of districts for which appellants contended
would be undesirable and, because based on race or place of origin, would
themselves be unconstitutional." Ibid.
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maintain the system to keep whites from returning to power.
In sum, as long as racial consciousness exists in Burke
County, its governmental structure is subject to attack.
Perhaps those more familiar than I with political maneuvering will be able to identify with greater accuracy and reliability those subjective intentions that are legitimate and those
that are not. Because judges may not possess such expertise, however, I am afraid the Court is planting seeds that
may produce an unexpected harvest.
The costs and the doubts associated with litigating questions of motive, which are often significant in routine trials,
will be especially so in cases involving the "motives" of legislative bodies. 29 Often there will be no evidence that the governmental system was adopted for a discriminatory reason. 30
29
Professor Karst has strongly criticized motivational analysis on the
ground that it is inadequate to protect black citizens from unconstitutional
conduct:
"[E]ven though the proof will center on the effects of what officials have
done, the ultimate issue will be posed in terms of the goodness or the evil of
the officials' hearts. Courts have long regarded such inquiries as unseemly, as the legislative investigation cases of the 1950's attest. The
principal concern here is not that tender judicial sensitivities may be
bruised, but that a judge's reluctance to challenge the purity of other officials' motives may cause her to fail to recognize valid claims of racial discrimination even when the motives for governmental action are highly suspect. Because an individual's behavior results from the interaction of a
multitude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the margin of consciousness, in any given case there almost certainly will be an
opportunity for a governmental official to argue that his action was
prompted by racially neutral considerations. When that argument is
made, should we not expect the judge to give the officials the benefit of the
moral doubt? When the governmental action is the product of a group decision, will not that tendency toward generosity be heightened?" Karst,
The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163,
1164-1165 (1978) (footnote omitted).
To reject an examination into subjective intent is not to rule that the reasons for legislative action are irrelevant. "In my opinion, customary indicia of legislative intent provide an adequate basis for ascertaining the purpose that a law is intended to achieve. The formal proceedings of the
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The reform movement in municipal government, see n. 20,
supra, or an attempt to comply with the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, may account for the enactment of
countless at-large systems. In such a case the question becomes whether the system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. Whose intentions control? Obviously not the
voters, although they may be most responsible for the attitudes and actions of local government. 31 Assuming that it is
the intentions of the "state actors" that is critical, how will
their mental processes be discovered? Must a specific proposal for change be defeated? What if different motives are
held by different legislators or, indeed, by a single official?
Is a selfish desire to stay in office sufficient to justify a failure
to change a governmental system?
The Court avoids these problems by failing to answer the
very question that its standard asks. Presumably, accordlegislature and its committees, the effect of the measure as evidenced by
its text, the historical setting in which it was enacted, and the public acts
and deeds of its sponsors and opponents, provide appropriate evidence of
legislative purpose." Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830,
856 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If a challenged law disadvantages minority citizens and its justifications-as evidenced by customary indicia of legislative intent-are insufficient to persuade a neutral observer that the law was enacted for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons,
it is, in my opinion, invalid.
30
As the Court of Appeals noted: "The general election laws in many jurisdictions were originally adopted at a time when Blacks had not received
their franchise. No one disputes that such laws were not adopted to
achieve an end, the exclusion of Black voting, that was the status quo.
Other states' election laws, though adopted shortly after the enactment of
the Fifteenth Amendment, are so old that whatever evidence of discriminatory intent may have existed, has long since disappeared. This case
falls within that category. The focus then becomes the existence of a discriminatory purpose for the maintenance of such a system." 639 F. 2d, at
1363, n. 7.
3
' Apart from the lack of "state action," the very purpose of the secret
ballot is to protect the individual's right to cast a vote without explaining to
anyone for whom, or for what reason, the vote is cast .
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ing to the Court's analysis, the Burke County governmental
structure is unconstitutional because it was maintained at
some point for an invidious purpose. Yet the Court scarcely
identifies the manner in which changes to a county governmental structure are made. There is no reference to any unsuccessful attempt to replace the at-large system with singlemember districts. It is incongruous that subjective intent is
identified as the constitutional standard and yet the persons
who allegedly harbored an improper intent are never identified or mentioned. Undoubtedly, the evidence relied on by
the Court proves that racial prejudice has played an important role in the history of Burke County and has motivated
many wrongful acts by various community leaders. But unless that evidence is sufficient to prove that every governmental action was motivated by a racial animus--and may be
remedied by a federal court-the Court has failed under its
own test to demonstrate that the governmental structure of
Burke County was maintained for a discriminatory purpose.
Certainly governmental action should not be influenced by
irrelevant considerations. I am not convinced, however,
that the Constitution affords a right-and this is the only
right the Court finds applicable in this case-to have every
official decision made without the influence of considerations
that are in some way "discriminatory." Is the failure of a
state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
invalid if a federal judge concludes that a majority of the legislators harbored stereotypical views of the proper role of
women in society? Is the establishment of a memorial for
Jews slaughtered in World War II unconstitutional if civic
leaders believe that their cause is more meritorious than that
of victimized Palestinian refugees? Is the failure to adopt a
state holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr. invalid if it is
proved that state legislators believed that he does not deserve to be commemorated? Is the refusal to provide Medic-
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aid funding for abortions unconstitutional if officials intend to
discriminate against women who would abort a fetus? 32
A rule that would invalidate all governmental action motivated by racial, ethnic or political considerations is too broad.
Moreover, in my opinion the Court is incorrect in assuming
that the intent of elected officials is invidious when they are
motivated by a desire to retain control of the local political
machinery. For such an intent is surely characteristic of
politicians throughout the country. In implementing that
sort of purpose, dominant majorities have used a wide variety of techniques to limit the political strength of aggressive
minorities. In this case the minority is defined by racial
characteristics, but minority groups seeking an effective political voice can, of course, be identified in many other ways.
The Hasidic Jews in Kings County, New York, 33 the Puerto
Ricans in Chicago, 34 the Spanish-speaking citizens in Dallas, 35
the Bohemians in Cedar Rapids, 36 the Federalists in Massa32
A stereotypical reaction to particular characteristics of a disfavored
group cannot justify discriminatory legislation. See, e. g., Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 520-521 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). It is nevertheless important to remember that the First Amendment protects an individual's right to entertain unsound and unpopular beliefs-including stereotypical beliefs about classes of persons-and to expound those beliefs
publicly. There is a vast difference between rejecting an irrational belief
as a justification for discriminatory legislation and concluding that neutral
legislation is invalid because it was motivated by an irrational belief.
Fresh air and open discussion are better cures for vicious prejudice than
are secrecy and dissembling. No matter how firmly I might disagree with
a legislator's motivation in casting a biased vote, I not only must respect
his right to form his own opinions, cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U. S. 50, 63 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), but also would prefer a candid
explanation of those opinions to a litigation-oriented silence.
33
See United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144.
34
See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago , 466 F. 2d 830 (CA7 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U. S. 893.
85
See White v. R egester, 412 U. S. 755.
36
See Rice, Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement
In America, 1901-1920, 78 (Univ. of Texas Press 1977) .
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chusetts,:n the Democrats in Indiana, 38 and the Republicans in
California 39 have all been disadvantaged by deliberate political maneuvers by the dominant majority. As I have stated,
a device that serves no purpose other than to exclude minority groups from effective political participation is unlawful
under objective standards. But if a political majority's intent to maintain control of a legitimate local government is
sufficient to invalidate any electoral device that makes it
more difficult for a minority group to elect candidates-regardless of the nature of the interest that gives the minority
group cohesion-the Court is not just entering a "political
thicket"; it is entering a vast wonderland of judicial review of
political activity.
The obvious response to this suggestion is that this case involves a racial group and that governmental decisions that
disadvantage such a group must be subject to special scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore must consider whether the Court's holding can legitimately be confined to political groups that are identified by racial
characteristics.
IV
Governmental action that discriminates between individuals on the basis of their race is, at the very least, presumptively irrational. 4° For an individual's race is virtually always irrelevant to his right to enjoy the benefits and to share
The term "gerrymander" arose from an election district-that took the
shape of a salamander-formed in Massachusetts by Governor Elbridge
Gerry's Jeffersonian or Democratic-Republican Party. The phrase was
coined by Gerry's opponents, the Federalists.
38
See Congressional Quarterly, May 2, 1981, p. 758.
39
See Congressional Quarterly, May 30, 1981, p. 941.
0
' Since I do not understand the Court's opinion to rely on an affirmative
action rationale, I put that entire subject to one side. If that were the
rationale for the Court's holding, however, there would be no need to inquire into subjective intent.
37
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the responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic society.
Persons of different races, like persons of different religious
faiths and different political beliefs, are equal in the eyes of
the law.
Groups of every character may associate together to
achieve legitimate common goals. If they voluntarily identify themselves by a common interest in a specific issue, by a
common ethnic heritage, by a common religious belief, or by
their race, that characteristic assumes significance as the
bond that gives the group cohesion and political strength.
When referring to different kinds of political groups, this
Court has consistently indicated that, to borrow JUSTICE
BRENNAN's phrasing, the Equal Protection Clause does not
make some groups of citizens more equal than others. See
Zobel v. Williams,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Thus, the Court has considered challenges to discrimination based on "differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions [or] political affiliations," American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92; to redistricting
plans that serve "to further racial or economic discrimination,
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149; to biases "tending to
favor particular political interests or geographic areas."
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182, 187. Indeed, in its opinion
today the Court recognizes that the practical impact of the
electoral system at issue applies equally to any "distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political
group." Ante, at 3.
A constitutional standard that gave special protection to
political groups identified by racial characteristics would be
inconsistent with the basic tenet of the Equal Protection
Clause. Those groups are no more or no less able to pursue
their interests in the political arena than are groups defined
by other characteristics. Nor can it be said that racial alliances are so unrelated to political action that any electoral decision that is influenced by racial consciousness-as opposed
to other forms of political consciousness-is inherently ir-
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rational. For it is the very political power of a racial or ethnic group that creates a danger that an entrenched majority
will take action contrary to the group's political interests.
"The mere fact that a number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create the need
for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their
common interests are strong enough to be manifested in political action that the need arises. Thus the characteristic of
the group which creates the need for protection is its political
character." Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F. 2d
830, 852 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It would be
unrealistic to distinguish racial groups from other political
groups on the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in the
political process.
Racial consciousness and racial association are not desirable features of our political system. We all look forward to
the day when race is an irrelevant factor in the political process. In my opinion, however, that goal will best be achieved
by eliminating the vestiges of discrimination that motivate
disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups to vote as identifiable
units. Whenever identifiable groups of our society are disadvantaged, they will share common political interests and
tend to vote as a "bloc." In this respect, racial groups are
like other political groups. A permanent constitutional rule
that treated them differently would, in my opinion, itself
tend to perpetuate race as a feature distinct from all others; a
trait that makes persons different in the eyes of the law.
Such a rule would delay-rather than advance-the goal advocated by Justice Douglas:
"When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State,
the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather
than to political issues are generated; communities seek
not the best representative but the best racial or reli-
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gious partisan. Since that system is at war with the
democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, 67 (dissenting opinion).
My conviction that all minority groups are equally entitled
to constitutional protection against the misuse of the majority's political power does not mean that I would abandon judicial review of such action. As I have written before, a gerrymander as grotesque as the boundaries condemned in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 264 U. S. 339, is intolerable whether
it fences out black voters, Republican voters, or Irish-Catholic voters. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (concurring
opinion). But if the standard the Court applies today extends to all types of minority groups, it is either so broad that
virtually every political device is vulnerable or it is so undefined that federal judges can pick and choose almost at will
among those that will be upheld and those that will be condemned.
There are valid reasons for concluding that certain minority groups-such as the black voters in Burke County, Georgia-should be given special protection from political oppression by the dominant majority. But those are reasons that
justify the application of a legislative policy choice rather
than a constitutional principle that cannot be confined to special circumstances or to a temporary period in our history.
Any suggestion that political groups in which black leadership predominates are in need of a permanent constitutional
shield against the tactics of their political opponents underestimates the resourcefulness, the wisdom, and the demonstrated capacity of such leaders. I cannot accept the Court's
constitutional holding. 41
41
The Court does not address the statutory question whether the atlarge system violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Neither the
District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered this issue. Since appellees have been granted full relief by the Court, I express no opinion on
their statutory claims.
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I respectfully dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
dissenting.
I

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), establishes that an
at-large voting system must be upheld against constitutional
attack unless maintained for a discriminatory purpose. In
Mobile we reversed a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution
because the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as
a matter of law to establish discriminatory intent. See 446
U. S., at 73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The District
Court and Court of Appeals in this case based their findings
of unconsitutional discrimination on the same factors held insufficient in Mobile. Yet the Court now finds their conclusion unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also affirmed
that the concept of "intent" was no mere fiction, and held that
the District Court had erred in "its failure to identify the
state officials whose intent it considered relevant." I d., at
74 n. 20. Although the courts below did not answer that
question in this case, the Court today affirms their decision.
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court's opinion cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case. There are
some variances in the largely sociological evidence presented
in the two cases. But Mobile held that this kind of evidence

..

80--2100-DISSENT
2

ROGERSv.LODGE

was not enough. Such evidence, we found in Mobile, did not
merely fall short, but "fell jar short[,] of showing that [an atlarge electoral scheme was] 'conceived or operated [as a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial ... discrimination."' ld.,
at 70 (emphasis added), quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U. S. 124, 149 (1971). Because I believe that Mobile controls this case, I dissent.
II

The Court's decision today relies heavily on the capacity of
the federal district courts-essentially free from any standards propounded by this Court-to determine whether atlarge voting systems are "being maintained for the invidious
purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population." Ante, at 9. Federal courts thus are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into the motivations of
local officials in structuring local governments. Inquiries of
this kind not only can be "unseemly," see Karst, The Costs of
Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego Law Rev. 1163, 1164
(1978); they intrude the federal courts-with only the vaguest constitutional direction-into an area of intensely local
and political concern.
Emphasizing these considerations, JUSTICE STEVENS,
post, at - - , argues forcefully that the Court's focus of inquiry is seriously mistaken. I agree with much of what he
says.
As I do not share his views entirely, however, I
write separately.
A
As I understand it, JUSTICE STEVENS's critique of the
Court's approach rests on three principles with which I am in
fundamental agreement.
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between "state action
that inhibits an individual's right to vote and state action that
affects the political strength of various groups." Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (STEVENS, J., concurring); see post,
at - - . Under this distinction, this case is fundamentally
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different from cases involving direct barriers to voting.
There is no claim here that blacks may not register freely and
vote for whom they choose. This case also differs from oneman, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a
person's vote less weighty in some districts than in others.
Second, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that vote dilution
cases of this kind are difficult if not impossible to distinguish-especially in their remedial ·aspect-from other actions to redress gerrymanders. See post, at--.
Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS clearly is correct in arguing
that the standard used to identify unlawful racial discrimination in this area should be defined in terms that are judicially
manageable and reviewable. See post, at - - . In the absence of compelling reasons of both law and fact, the federal
judiciary is unwarranted in undertaking to restructure state
political systems. This is inherently a political area, where
the identification of a seeming violation does not necessarily
suggest an enforceable judicial remedy-or at least none
short of a system of quotas or group representation. Any
such system, of course, would be antithetical to the principles
of our democracy.
B
JUSTICE STEVENS would accommodate these principles by
holding that subjective intent is irrelevant to the establishment of a case of racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See post, at - - . Despite sharing the concerns from which his position is developed, I would not accept
this view. "The central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242 (1976). Because I am unwilling to abandon this central principle in cases of this kind,
I cannot join JUSTICE STEVENS's opinion.
Nonetheless, I do agree with him that what he calls "objective" factors should be the focus of inquiry in vote-dilution
cases. Unlike the considerations on which the lower courts
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relied in this case and in Mobile, the factors identified by JusTICE STEVENS as "objective" in fact are direct, reliable, and
unambiguous indices of discriminatory intent. If we held, as
I think we should, that the district courts must place primary
reliance on these factors to establish discriminatory intent,
we would prevent federal court inquiries into the subjective
thought processes of local officials-at least until enough objective evidence had been presented to warrant discovery
into subjective motivations in this complex, politically
charged area. By prescribing such a rule we would hold federal courts to a standard that was judicially manageable.
And we would remain faithful to the central protective purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.
In the absence of proof of discrimination by reliance on the
kind of objective factors identified by JUSTICE STEVENS, I
would hold that the factors cited by the Court of Appeals are
too attenuated as a matter of law to support an inference of
discriminatory intent. I would reverse its judgment on that
basis.
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